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Abstract. Nowadays, deep learning technology is growing faster and
shows dramatic performance in computer vision. However, it turns out
that the deep learning model is highly vulnerable to small perturba-
tion called an adversarial attack. So far, although many of the defense
mechanism has been proposed to mitigate the effect of the adversarial at-
tack, all of them are under rigorous assumptions. However, our approach
is not tied up any assumptions since our insight stems from the Ten-
sor Decomposition. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrated that
decomposing the tensor would be an effective countermeasure against
several adversarial attacks. We conducted experiments with well-known
benchmarks such as MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet dataset. Our ex-
perimental results show that this simple method has capable of having
attack resilience and robustness against adversarial attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first approach to leverage the tensor decom-
position as a defense mechanism. We hope that leveraging the tensor
decomposition becomes a universal approach to solve inherent corner
cases of deep learning models.
Keywords: Adversarial example, Tensor decomposition
1 Introduction
Over the past several years, advances in deep neural networks (DNNs) have
widely expanded the ability of what the machine can deal with. Especially,
DNNs have achieved remarkable successes for image classification [14,24] and
it even goes beyond human capability [9]. With this performance, deep learn-
ing technology has started to be applied to various areas. However, some papers
[28,7,2,15,16,20,6,5] proved that even DNNs can be easily fooled by small changes
to input that is imperceptible to a human eye. According to these studies, care-
fully crafted perturbations to the vision-based applications can induce systems
to behave in unexpected ways. Indeed, this is small enough to be inconspicuous,
but some researches show that its influence might be more than expected since
even state-of-the-art models get an almost zero-classification accuracy under [2].
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Considering the deep learning models do not hesitate whenever judge the
output, it might cause crucial accidents. For instance, Fig. 1 represents the ad-
versarial examples in the image classification task. Although all of the images can
be seen as an ostrich by human visible intuition, deep learning model outputs
clearly different labels due to lack of such intuition. From a more theoretical
perspective, misclassification occurs when the adversarial perturbations cross
the decision boundary, but the existing classifier has no such intuition that can
ward it off. Now, the corner case of DNNs which have been alluded to adver-
sarial attacks is getting pervasive and being more sophisticated. As a result, the
vulnerability of adversarial attacks hinders its adoption for some safety-critical
system and also security-sensitive application, including an autonomous-driving
car [6,25].
Fig. 1. Adversarial Examples crafted by an attack algorithm [5]
Since the advent of such adversarial attacks, many researchers or vendors
have paid significant attention to adversarial examples. This is because they
might not want to go through all the risks of their applications or models. They
might as well choose to verify the robustness rather than take risks. However,
the resistance against adversarial examples renders another challenge, for no
method can be a cure-all against adversarial attacks. To make up for corner
cases of DNNs, several studies [7,28,19,21,26,10,18,32] have proposed the defense
mechanism against adversarial attacks to mitigate the potential of the risk by
adversary. These defense mechanisms can be viewed as two main approaches:
(1) changing the model itself, which can improve the robustness by training
with adversarial examples, e.g., adversarial training [7,28,29], (2) preprocessing
the inputs to diminish the effect of adversarial noise, e.g., Magnet, Comdefend,
PixelDefend, Defense-GAN, HGD, etc. [19,10,26,23,18,32].
However, (1) are designed to deal with specific adversarial attack strategies in
mind, so generalization is likely to be restricted. It implies that the models using
this method may be vulnerable to another attack optimized with such attack
strategies. On the other hand, (2) utilize models with a vast amount of legitimate
data to purify the inputs itself, instead of assuming some attack strategies. The
main point of (2) is to measure the distance between the inputs and manifold
of the legitimate images, and then approximate or guide the adversarial images
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closer to the manifold of the legitimate images. To purify the inputs, therefore, a
well-generalized model should be required to assure the performance. Given that
the adversarial images occupy the low probability region trained with legitimate
samples [26], poorly generalized models cannot ensure that the aforementioned
approaches get a good result. Also, another attack technique might be created by
an adversary who knows the model’s structure. In a nutshell, as these approaches
are likely to be a temporary expedient, the universal defense approaches which
can cover a myriad of risk should be explored.
Here, we propose a novel intuition for deep learning models, which can make
the model universally robust. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
approach to explore the defense in terms of the universal point of view. Our
approach leverages the potential power of the tensor decomposition to diminish
the effect of adversarial noise by using the reconstructed images as an input of a
deep learning model. The reconstructed inputs are fed into the classifier, and we
experimentally demonstrate that such simple preprocessing could be an effective
countermeasure against the adversarial attack. On MNIST, a degradation of
top-1 accuracy on adversarial example is less than 1% against four adversarial
attacks and less than 10 % on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. This result outperforms
recent defense mechanisms [18,10]. To ensure that deep learning applications
extend their potential of utilization toward other domains, it would be better
to take into account the robustness of those applications. If you want to avoid
cherry-picking doubt and make the model more general across a variety of risks
including adversarial attacks, our insight would be an interesting candidate. Our
contribution is as follows:
1. High Compatibility. Our approach leverages the tensor decomposition for
preprocessing the inputs which might have been affected by the adversary.
We do not assume anything such as attack strategies or classifiers, just use
an input as a reconstructed input by using the tensor decomposition method,
which indicates that our proposed method can be relatively easy to utilize
and be applied to whatever the classifier is.
2. Efficient Engineering Complexity. As we mentioned above, tensor de-
composition just depends on what the input it is, so it is not tied up with
the attack strategies or classifiers. Therefore, we do not need to focus on
how the model classifies the input since tensor decomposition is free from
the model dependency. It implies that retraining the model or augmenting
the training data could no longer be required. It requires only processing
time to reconstruct inputs. Even more, the processing time is negligible.
3. Integrity of the inputs. When it comes to the reconstruction process,
some information that in charge of the important role might be lost. Al-
though state-of-the-art approaches [18,10] have gotten remarkable perfor-
mance, their proposed model degrades the performance with even the clean
images. This is some kind of a trade-off. It thus makes it difficult to apply de-
fense mechanisms. However, tensor decomposition could incur less adverse
effects on the clean images, and ensure its performance even at the high-
dimension dataset such as ImageNet.
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2 Related work
Adversarial Attacks. Szegedy et al. found the existence of adversarial pertur-
bation that breaks the image classifier thorough solving adversarial optimization
problem [28,7]. They show the model accuracy is dropped even though the per-
turbed image looks similar to human eyes. Goodfellow et al. [7] uses the sign of
the gradient of input with respect to the loss function of the target model. This
method is called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) since it updates input once.
With a similar idea, [15] uses FGSM in an iterative way. Chen et al. [5] leverages
L1 distortion to generate effective adversarial examples and improve the attack
transferability which refers to the attack success rate using the adversarial exam-
ples which come from the substitute models. In other words, high transferability
implies that the performance of the target model might depreciate even without
the knowledge about the model, i.e., black box attack. Carlini and Wagner [2]
changes the optimization problem defined in [28] for achieving more powerful at-
tack. [20] measures the minimum size required for the attack. They approximate
the decision boundary of the model and update input repeatably until the model
misclassifies it. Besides the image classification task, [6,25] demonstrated that
adversarial attacks can be applied beyond the digital space, so security concerns
could arise in even physical space such as the autonomous-driving car.
Adversarial Defense. To counter adversarial attacks, some works trained
the model with adversarial examples to ensure that the model has a resilience
against those adversarial examples, which have been called adversarial training.
During the process of training, they generate adversarial images for improving
the performance. Although it works, it depends on the particular adversarial
data used in the training process. For instance, [16] shows their approach is
robust in the simple attack, but not in a more sophisticated attack. In addition,
it has an engineering penalty since it requires retraining the model. If it takes
longer to create an adversarial example, it will take more time to retrain the
model. Instead of using the data augmentation, methods to change the model
itself were also proposed [21]. They change the objective function of the problem
for obtaining the robustness. However, this approach also has to retrain the
model, so it also boils down to increasing the engineering complexity.
In recent years, several papers [19,10,26,18,32,23] preprocess the inputs before
putting into the classifier. They propose the model which serves the direction
to approximate the distribution of the adversarial images as close as possible
to the decision boundary. All of the methods require a well-generalized defense
model, so the even clean images could be affected when the model is poorly
generalized. It results in damage to the integrity of the inputs. To guarantee the
integrity of the model, all of them require well-generalized classifiers to detect
if the input is adversarial or approximate the manifold of legitimate samples.
Our approach is similar to those approaches in terms of the preprocessing, yet
differentiation is our method does not need any premises, including the detector
or well-generalized models. Consequently, our method does not hurt the perfor-
mance in terms of integrity.
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3 Background
3.1 Adversarial Attack
Basically, all of the attacks use the gradient of data with respect to the loss
function of the target model. In this section, we briefly review the basic method
of adversarial attack.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): The FGSM is proposed by [7]. It is
a simple and effective attack method. The image X is perturbed as follows.
X = X +  · |sign(OX l(X, ytrue))| (1)
Where  is a magnitude of noise and l(X, ytrue) is a loss with respect to the true
label of the image. It adjusts input X by adding a sign of the gradient of X.
It increases the loss function of the target model so that the model misjudges
the adjusted input. Since it updates input X once, it is also called single-step
method.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM): The BIM is a repetitive version of FGSM
[15]. it is a more powerful attack method compared to the FGSM. And it is also
called Iterative FGSM. It uses the following equations:
Xt+1 = clipX,(Xt + α · |sign(OX l(Xt, ytrue))|) (2)
Where X0 = X, α is a step size for adjusting Xt , and clip function ensures that
Xt ∈ (X − ,X + ) for all t. It is also called multi-step method. Here α is the 1
in the scale of 0 to 255 in the original paper.
DeepFool: DeepFool attack approximates the decision boundary of a classifier,
and measure the minimal perturbations that are sufficient to fool the classifier
[20]. For the affine multiclass classifier, they calculate the distance d as follows.
d =
|fk(x)− fl(x)|
w′
where w′ = ‖∇fk(x)−∇fl(x)‖2 (3)
Here fk and fl are classifier for k and l-th class. Similar to BIM, they update x in
an iterative way. For nonlinear classifiers, they approximate the linear boundary
and find the distance to fool the nonlinear classifier.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W): Carlini and Wagner [2] define an optimizaion
problem to find an adversarial example. They define following optimizaion for-
mulation.
minδ D(x, x+ δ) + c · f(x+ δ) (4)
Here D is a distance metric to measure the distance between the clean im-
age and adversarial image. f(·) is an objective function to control the result of
original classifier C. C&W attack is one of the most powerful attacks in this
literature. We visualize the adversarial image generated by each method in Fig.
2
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(a) clean (b) FGSM (c) BIM (d) DeepFool (e) C&W
Fig. 2. Visualization of adversarial examples on each method. The pre-trained
Resnet101 [9] model classifies clean image as a monarch, image with FGSM as
a sea slug, image with BIM as a Doberman, image with DeepFool as a hornbill
and image with C&W as a longicorn. However, we can check that theses images
seem to the same in the human eye
3.2 Tensor Decomposition
A tensor is a multi-dimensional array. For instance, the color image is a tensor
consists of height, width, and the color channel. A tensor decomposition method
decomposes a tensor into low dimension tensors. The CANDECOMP/PARAFC
[4,8] decomposition approximates a tensor X as a sum of the outer product
of the tensor belonging to each dimension as Fig. 3. We refer to this as a CP
decomposition.
Fig. 3. CP decomposition of tensor X ∈ RI×J×K . X is approximately repre-
sented by the sum of the outer product of the tensor
Let X ∈ RI×J×K , ai ∈ RI , bi ∈ RJ and ci ∈ RK for i = 1, . . . , r. Here r is
the number of components and it is a hyperparameter. If r is small, tensorX is
approximated into low dimension tensor. So we call deciding r as choosing the
dimension for convenience. Then xijk is approximated as follows.
xijk ≈
r∑
l=1
ailbjlckl (5)
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The Tucker decomposition [30,31] is another way to decompose a tensor. It
is a kind of higher order principal component analysis [12]. It decomposes tensor
as a core tensor and factor tensors as Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Tucker decomposition of tensor X ∈ RI×J×K . X decomposed as a core
tensor G and factor tensors A,B and C
Let X ∈ RI×J×K , A ∈ RI×P , B ∈ RJ×Q, C ∈ RI×Rand G ∈ RP×Q×R for
i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , J, k = 1, . . . ,K. Here the size of the core tensor P,Q
and R are the number of the components and it is hyperparameter. When the
size of the core tensor is fixed, the size of the factor tensor is decided according
to the size of the core tensor. Similar to the number of the components of CP
decomposition, we call deciding the size of the core tensor as a choosing the
dimension. Then xijk is approximated as follows.
xijk ≈
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
R∑
r=1
gpqraipbjqckr (6)
4 Method
To mitigate the effect of the adversarial attacks, our insight stems from the
tensor decomposition. In this section, all the paragraphs that describe revolve
around how we can apply this magic, i.e., tensor decomposition, as a defense
mechanism against the adversarial attacks.
4.1 Tensor decomposition as a preprocessing
As you can see in Fig. 2, adversarial examples are too sophisticated to be rec-
ognized by human senses, including well-generalized deep learning models. To
prevent the potential threat, our model simply uses the reconstructed image
from the tensor decomposition as an input. We conjecture that the effect of
the adversarial perturbations could be reduced by approximating the tensors
toward the low dimension. To cast light on our hypothesis, we conduct brief ex-
periments based on the visual sense. Fig. 5 represents the examples of the noise.
Intuitively, adversarial noise crafted by the FGSM seems to distinguishable from
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others, while the rest of them are relatively similar to each other. In other words,
the tensor decomposition can transform adversarial noise into random noise, e.g.,
gaussian noise. We can say that the tensor decomposition has an ability to purify
the adversarial noise in this regard. Even though such random noise might also
degrade the performance, it would be no worse than original adversarial noise
considering they are crafted by adversarial intend.
(a) FGSM noise (b) Gaussian noise (c) Tucker noise (d) Cp noise
Fig. 5. Visualization of example noises. (a) is the adversarial noise crafted by
FGSM. (b) is the gaussian noise, (c),(d) are reconstructed images by using
Tucker, CP decomposition respectively
(a) Reconstruction from CP decomposition
(b) Reconstruction from Tucker decomposition
Fig. 6. We show a change of reconstructed images using CP and Tucker decom-
position by varying the value of the dimension (The value is getting higher order
by left → right)
Based on this light, we utilize CP and Tucker decomposition methods to
verify how effective these methods actually are under various attack strategies.
Before the main experiments, both methods require to set the dimension, e.g.,
r for the CP and P,Q, R for the Tucker. As the dimension of the tensor in-
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creases, the quality of the reconstructed image gets better as shown in Fig. 6.
The high quality of the reconstructed image is not always better, however, so
the dimension needs to be decided in a heuristic manner. We thus studied the
ablation study to find out the effective hyperparameters under CP and Tucker
and consider two kinds of factors to decide the hyperparameters, accuracy and
time complexity. We randomly sampled 1,000 images from CIFAR-10, and then
generate the adversarial images by applying FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, and C&W,
respectively. As follow, those images are reconstructed by CP and Tucker de-
composition. Finally, we measured the accuracy and time complexity using the
reconstructed images.
(a) Top-1 accuracy (b) Processing time for single image
Fig. 7. (a) Accuracy with respect to dimension (b) Mean time for processing
single image with respect to dimension
The result summarized in Fig. 7. While accuracy increased as dimensions in-
creased by the middle, accuracy tends to decrease gradually. And the processing
time increases as dimension increases. So we decide to use 40 % of the origi-
nal dimension. For instance, the size of the image is 32 by 32 in the CIFAR-10
dataset. In the case of CP decomposition, the size of the three tensors in Fig. 3
will be 32,32 and 3. So we choose rank r = 8. We use a similar argument when
choosing the size of the core tensor of Tucker decomposition. In particular, we
don’t compress the channel dimension 3 in Tucker decomposition since we don’t
want to lose color information. Thus, the size of the core tensor of the Tucker
decomposition is in the form of height, width and 3. We use an open-source
library [13] for each decomposition method.
4.2 Denoise Autoencoder as a supplement
We should consider one more thing before putting the input value into the clas-
sifier. When it comes to reconstructing the images, we should consider the loss
of information as it might affect the classification result. If the input is clean
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images, it would work even worse. To diminish the adverse effect from that
point, we add denoise autoencoder into the procedure. Our method is based on
a coarse-to-fine approach. Through the reconstructed inputs from decomposed
tensors, we remove the coarse-grained adversarial features. We expect that some
fine-grained features that might be lost by the coarse-grained approachwhich
is more likely to occur in high-dimension, could be compensated pass through
the denoise autoencoder. Equipped with this approach, we set up the denoise
autoencoder architecture as follows. The numerical value in Table 1 stands for
input channel and output channel respectively. And the filter size is 3× 3.
Table 1. Architecture of autoencoder trained with each dataset
MNIST CIFAR
Conv,ELU 1 2 Conv,ELU 3 6
Conv,ELU 2 4 Conv,ELU 6 12
Conv,ELU 4 8 Conv,ELU 12 24
Conv,ELU 8 16 Conv,ELU 24 48
Conv,ELU 16 32 Conv,ELU 48 96
Conv,ELU 32 16 Conv,ELU 96 48
Conv,ELU 16 8 Conv,ELU 48 24
Conv,ELU 8 4 Conv,ELU 24 12
Conv,ELU 4 2 Conv,ELU 12 6
Conv,ELU 2 1 Conv,ELU 6 3
We utilize the CIFAR-10 images at the RGB scale and MNIST image at the
grayscale. We set the learning rate to 1e−4 and used Adam [11] as an optimizer.
And we use mean square error (MSE) for loss function. For both models, we train
autoencoder for 10 epochs. We henceforth denote autoencoder as AE.
4.3 Overall architecture
We describe the overall architecture in detail. Fig. 8 represents the overall flow
of our proposed method. First, we approximate the input image via the tensor
decomposition method. The inputs could be adversarial images or clean images.
Our method does not spend time deciding whether the input is adversarial or
not. That’s the reason why our model does not require a well-generalized model.
In other words, whatever the input is, our model splits the input into several
tensors based on CP or Tucker decomposition, and then reconstruct them. As
follows, the reconstructed images are passed through the denoise autoencoder,
which might compensate for losing the information that may in charge of an
important role in that image. Note that our method does not have a model
dependency, so it can be applied in conjunction with every classifier.
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Fig. 8. Overall flow of our proposed method
5 Experiment
5.1 Dataset
For the MNIST, CIFAR-10 data, we test on the full test data, which are com-
posed of 10,000 images on MNIST and 50,000 images on CIFAR-10. For Im-
ageNet, we select randomly 1,000 images as similar setting [10,17]. Since our
proposed method decomposes the input whichever clean image or adversarial
image, we tested on both clean images and adversarial images.
5.2 Evaluation
We measure the top-1 accuracy on clean images and adversarial images on each
dataset. For MNIST, we use a simple model consists of two convolutional layers.
For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we basically use pre-trained Resnet101 [9]. In
particular, for CIFAR-10, we finetune pre-trained Resnet101 for 10 classes. We
use FGSM, BIM, DeepFool and C&W attack methods. For the distance metric,
a related research area mainly uses L∞ and L2 norm [3,10]. In detail, we use
L∞ for FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool attack. And for the C&W attack, we use
a L2 metric. We try to find small perturbation when applying the adversarial
attack since the noise is visible when the perturbation is not small enough. We
generate adversarial images by using open source library Foolbox [22]. In detail,
we try 100 epsilons from 0 to 1 for FGSM. For BIM, we set 5 as a number of
iteration. And for DeepFool, we set 50 as a maximum number of steps and set 50
as a maximum iteration number of C&W. And we measure the pre-processing
time for calculating the additional time consuming for the proposed method.
Also, we compare our results to other state-of-the-art defense models. For a fair
comparison, we compare the ratio between the accuracy of the clean image and
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the adversarial image since the accuracy of a clean image is a little bit different
depending on the setting.
5.3 Results
We achieve remarkably high accuracy against adversarial attacks. In most cases,
the CP is better than Tucker decomposition method. In some case of ImageNet
dataset, Tucker decomposition method is better than CP. For instance, when
attack with FGSM and C&W method, the result was the best by using Tucker
decomposition. And in the case of clean images, the accuracy reduction was
about 1% on all datasets. It means that we do not harm the original model in
a normal case which is the input image is clean. The autoencoder is highly ef-
fective on MNIST dataset. Although the autoencoder does not have much effect
on clean images, it improves the performance of various adversarial attacks on
MNIST dataset. In addition to MNIST dataset, there have been small perfor-
mance improvements for other datasets by using the denoise autoencoder. The
numerical results are summarized in Table 2, 3 and 4.
Table 2. Top-1 accuracy of each method on MNIST dataset
Model Method Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool C&W
2-Conv Net
Original 99.06 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00
CP 99.01 71.62 95.42 81.68 88.29
CP+AE 98.64 96.15 98.88 98.83 98.6
Tucker 99.06 71.95 91.81 79.32 84.52
Tucker+AE 98.06 95.26 98.65 98.54 98.05
Table 3. Top-1 accuracy of each method on CIFAR-10 dataset
Model Method Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool C&W
Resnet-101
Original 98.87 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CP 97.96 92.52 92.49 94.67 93.63
CP+AE 98.11 92.88 93.21 94.93 94
Tucker 95.99 87.74 87.68 90.73 90.57
Tucker+AE 96.00 88.44 88.56 91.28 91.2
Table 4. Top-1 accuracy of each method on ImageNet dataset
Model Method Clean FGSM BIM DeepFool C&W
Resnet-101
Original 77.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CP 76.3 61.2 75.4 75.7 61.2
CP+AE 74.8 62.9 75.00 75.5 62.1
Tucker 76.4 65.00 73.4 73.8 65.3
Tucker+AE 74.7 65.6 73.7 74.7 66
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Even the DeepFool and C&W attacks are more accurate and powerful attack
compared to the FGSM and BIM attacks, the accuracy after decomposition is
higher than the case of FGSM and BIM attacks.
5.4 Comparison with other defense methods
We measure the ratio of accuracy on clean images and adversarial images gen-
erated by FGSM, BIM, DeepFool and C&W attack for a fair comparison. Here
the L∞ is restricted to 8 in 255 scale. The defense ratio is defined as follows.
Defense ratio =
Top-1 accuracy on adversarial images
Top-1 accuracy on clean images
(7)
We compare the performance of recent defense methods, HGD [18] and Comde-
fend [10]. Fig. 9 shows the results. We select Resnet101 [9] and Inception V3
(IncV3) [27] as base model. And we tested on 1,000 images from the ImageNet
data. Our methods outperform in all cases compared to two recent defense meth-
ods. This result verifies that our method is effective. Moreover, our method does
not depend on attack methods and the target model classifier, thus it can be
easily combined with every model.
(a) Resnet101 on ImageNet (b) IncV3 on ImageNet
Fig. 9. (a) Defense ratio of each attack method on Resnet101 (b) Defense ratio of
each attack method on IncV3. Note that our method outperforms other defense
methods
5.5 Time analysis
We measure the preprocessing time of each method. We pick randomly 1,000
images in MNIST,CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. And we calculate the average pro-
cessing time per image. In most case, the CP decomposition requires more time
compared to Tucker decomposition. In the case of MNIST and CIFAR-10, the
time required to reconstruction is similar in both cases. However, In the case of
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ImageNet, the CP decomposition takes about 10 times more than the Tucker
method. Table 5 summarizes preprocessing time of each dataset on each method.
Table 5. Preprocessing time of the each dataset
dataset CP CP+AE Tucker Tucker + AE
MNIST 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004
CIFAR-10 0.1052 0.1161 0.01268 0.015
ImageNet 1.07 1.18 0.1566 0.17
5.6 White box scenario
In the white box scenario, we should assume the adversary knows full defense
mechanism according to [1]. In our method, note that the input image is al-
ways decomposed and reconstructed, and the decomposed components are al-
ways started from the random tensor. In detail, the component tensors of each
decomposition method initialized to random tensor and then trained to approx-
imate the original tensor. Thus, the input is always random tensor and the
original image is a label itself like unsupervised learning. Therefore, there are no
fixed weights, so the adversary can not generate adversarial examples concerning
the tensor decomposition method. Hence, our propose method is robust on the
white box attack scenario.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we verify the tensor decomposition is a simple and powerful method
for purifying the adversarial perturbation. When we combine denoise autoen-
coder with the tensor decomposition method, the proposed method achieves
higher accuracy against adversarial attacks. We experiment with our method
against various adversarial attacks such as DeepFool and C&W attacks and dis-
cuss why this method is robust in the white box scenario.
Our intuition applying tensor decomposition into the adversarial attack is as
follows. Since the adversarial perturbation is so small that it is hard to catch a
difference, such a small perturbation would be removed by approximating the
image tensor using low dimensional tensors. Since there is no straightforward al-
gorithm to choose the dimension of the component tensors of the CP and Tucker
decomposition, finding the best dimension remains for future work. Also, estab-
lishing a theoretical base why tensor decomposition is robust against adversarial
attack is left to our future work.
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